第10章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (4)

Thereareexceptions,however.Forexample,D.GaleJohnson,inhis"ResourceAllocationunderShareContracts,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy（April,1950）,isreluctanttoaccepttheinefficiencyargumentinspiteofhistheoreticalmodelwhichsupportsit.JohnLossingBuckandJamesO.Brayargueagainsttheinefficiencythesisonthegroundsthatobservationsoflanduseundersharecontractsfailtoconfirmthetraditionalbelief.SeeJ.L.Buck,ChineseFarmEconomy（Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1930）；andJ.O.Bray,"FarmTenancyandProductivityinAgriculture:TheCaseoftheUnitedStates,"FoodResearchInstituteStudies（1963）.Weshalldiscussthisinchapter3.

[2].InthePhilippines,forexample,therentalsharerestrictionwascarriedoutsimultaneouslywithaprogramofpulsoryredistributionofland.SeeFrateBull,"PhilippineLandReform,1950-1958,"InternationalCooperationAdministration,USOMIPhilippines（Manila,1958）.

B.TheNatureandOriginofTaiwanLandReform

Thedefinitionofalandreformhasbeenacontroversialconceptintheliteratureoflandtenure.Buttheterm"landreform"asusedherehasasimplemeaning.Itentailschangesinlawspertainingtolandownershipwhichaffectwealthdistributionorresourceallocation.

InTaiwan,forexample,themuchpublicizedfarmlandreformdidnotspringupatonetime:itwastheproductofaseriesofelaborateadjustmentsandenforcementsofthelawsalreadyinexistence.AftertheJapaneseretrocessionofTaiwantoChinain1945,theChinesecodeoflawpertainingtolandrightscameintoforce.Thissetoflaws,thecrucialarticlesofwhichwillbediscussedinthenextsection,hasundergonerapidmodificationsinceApril1949.Inthefollowingfouryears,atotalofover350articleswereappendedtodefinetheTaiwanlandreform.[1]Despiteitsplexity,wemaygenerallydividethereformintothreephases.

Thefirstphaseinvolvedarentlimitationprogram,underwhichtherentalpercentagewasreducedfromanestimatedmeanof56.8percenttoauniformlegalmaximumof37.5percentoftheannualcropyield.Duringthisphase,twosetsofprovisionswereestablished.Thefirstsetincludeseighteenarticles,promulgatedandenforcedinTaiwanfromApril14,1949.[2]Thesecondsetincludesthirty-onearticles,promulgatedonJune7,1951,andintendedtogointoeffectinFebruary1952.[3]Whiletheprovisionsofbothwillbeexaminedinlaterchapters,itistheeconomicimplicationsofthefirstsetuponwhichIshallconcentrate,forIcouldfindnoevidencethatthesecondsetwasactuallyenforced.

Thesecondphaseofthelandreformpertainstothesaleofpubliclandstoestablishowner-farmers.[4]Thisprogram,promulgatedinJune1951andcarriedoutfromJuly1951toJune1953,coveredaportionoffarmlandswhichwereunderstateownershipandhadbeenleasedtotenants.Themagnitudeoffarmingresourcesaffectedbythisprogramwasverysmall.[5]ThethirdphaseisthemostplexandisgenerallyregardedasthemainpartofthelandreforminTaiwan.Itinvolvedthepromulgationandenforcementofthe"Land-to-the-TillerAct,"beginninginJanuary1953.Underthisprogram,landholdingsofaprivatelandownerinexcessofthreehectareswerepulsorilypurchasedbythegovernment.Thepensationofferedwastwoandone-halftimesthegrossannualyieldofthelandbeingpurchased,paidbytheissuanceoflandbondsandindustrialstocksofgovernmententerprises.Thepurchasedlandswereresoldtotenantsinstipulatedparcelsatthesamenumericalprices,tobepaidforinten-yearinstallmentsatnointerestcharge.Afterthispulsoryredistributionofland,transfersoflandrightsamongindividualswereprohibited.[6]NeitherthesecondnorthethirdphaseoftheTaiwanlandreformwillbecoveredinthisstudy.

Despitethefactthatthereformprovisionsareseveralandvaried,twomonpolicyintentionscanbedetected.Firstisthepolicyattackingtenancyeitherbyinterveninginthetermsofthecontractto"protect"thetenantsorbyabolishingtenancyaltogether.Asecondintentionistoforcearedistributionofwealthinfavorofthetenants.ThelawmakersandreformofficialsinTaiwanhadlittledifficultyjustifyingtheirreformmeasures.Oneclaimedthattheexistingpropertysystemwassimplyoutofdate:

LandreforminTaiwanwascarriedoutatjusttherighttime.Thetimewasopportunebecausebythenthelandlordshadoutlivedtheirusefulnessandlandownershiphadbeeanobstacletofurtherdevelopmentofagricultureaswellasindustry……Withthelimitedfarmlandandtheirrationaltenuresystem,ruralunderemploymentpresentedaseriousproblem.[7]

Asecondjustificationofferedisthatfarmingundertenancy,andsharetenancyinparticular,iseconomicallyinefficientonthreecounts.[8]（1）Land-leasecontractswereusuallyshort-termornonperpetual.Thisdeprivedtenantsofsecurityandthereforewasinefficient.（2）Thetenant'sincentivetofarmwasdiscouragedbyasharecontract,sincepartofeveryunitofoutputproducedwouldgotothelandownerasrent.（3）And,sincetherentalscollectedbylandownerswereexorbitantlyhigh,thetenantslackedtheabilitytoinvest.

Athirdjustificationofferedbyreformersisthattenantswereexploitedbylandowners.Inadditiontothehighrent,asharecontract,theyclaimed,wasadeviceofexploitation.However,theevidencetheycitetosupportthe"exploitation"argumentisperhapscontradictorytotheirclaimofinefficienttenancy:forexample,landownersfrequentlystipulatedthattheirtenantsprovideseedsandfertilizers,andrequiredthattheyworkhard.[9]