第37章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (31)

Availabledataonthefrequenciesofescapeclauseadoptionsunderdifferentcontractsdonotrefutemysuggestions.AsurveyconductedbytheUniversityofNanking,coveringfourprovincesinChinain1935,revealsthattheescapeclause（asincontractsamplesaandc）wasadoptedin83percentofthecrop（fixed）rentcontracts,63percentofthecash（fixed）rentcontract,andnotatallinsharecontracts.[10]Thehigherfrequencyofadoptionforcroprentthancashrentiswhatwewouldexpect.Intheeventofagenerallypoorharvest,themarketpriceofagriculturalyieldwillrise,andwithcashrentthetenant'sinewillbepensatedbytheriseinpricemorethanwithcroprent;hence,theescapeclausewillbelesspreferabletothetenant.

Theexistenceoftheescapeclauseinthemarketimplies,otherthingsbeingequal,amorefrequentchoiceoffixed-rentcontractsthanofsharecontracts.OutsideChinainSoutheastAsia,beforetheagrarianreforms,theescapeclausewasunpopular.Thereexisted,however,someguaranteedminimumrentsorwagesassociatedwithsharecontracts.Theseguaranteescouldbesimilarlyanalyzedwiththesuggestedchoice-theoreticapproachifmoreinformationwereavailable.Thedifferentmarketpracticesexplain,inpart,thehigherfrequencyofsharecontractsinSoutheastAsiathaninChina.Indeed,thefermiersoftheFrenchmetayage,theescapeclauseassociatedwithfixedrentsinChina,andtheminimumguaranteesassociatedwithsharerentselsewherearemarketpracticesthatserveasintermediatearrangementsbetweenpurefixedrentsandpuresharerents.Eachofthemhasdifferentriskdistributionsandtransactioncosts,thuswideningtherangeofcontractualchoices.WhytheseintermediatearrangementsdifferindifferentmarketsisaquestionIdonotseektoanswer.

TurningtosamplecontractsofsharerentsinChina,wefindthattheirstipulationsaremoreplexthanthoseoffixedrents,owingtotheaddedstipulationsontenantinputsandcropstobegrown.

Sampled-sharecontractwithuniformsharingpercentagesforallcrops（ShantungProvince）：

TenantAagreestocultivate[somanymows]oflandforlandownerB.WeherebystipulatethattenantAprovides[somanyhead]ofwaterbuffalo,[somanybodies]ofmen;andeveryyearthetenantmustcultivatewheatonce,Indiancornthreetimes,andsoybeanstwice.Fertilizerexpensesaretobeshared[incertainproportions].Theyieldsofallcropsaretobeshared[incertainproportions].Theleasemayterminateonlyaftertheautumnharvest.[11]

Samplee-sharecontractwithvaryingsharingpercentages（HonanProvince）：

[Stipulationsoflandsizeandnonlandinputs]……Weherebystipulatethatthewheatyieldwillbesplit20-80；millet,yellowbeans,sesame,greenbean-allwillbesplit30-70；cottonandsweetpotatoessplit50-50……；milletstraws,andbeanandsesamestalkssplit30-70.[12]

Samplef-sharecontractwithsomeproductsunshared（HonanProvince）：

TenantA……voluntarilyagreestofurnish[somany]men,[somanyhead]ofwaterbuffaloanddonkeys……andallplowingequipment……Weclearlystipulatethatseedsofmajorcropsaretobeprovidedbythelandowner,andseedsofminorcropsbythetenant.Allcropyieldswillbesplitequally,indryandcleanform……Butthestrawsgotothe[tenant's]waterbuffaloentirely;thedroppingsgotothe[landowner's]soil;……andallfertilizerexpensesaretobeborneequallybybothparties.Allgrindingequipmentandlivingroomsareprovided[bythelandowner],whichthetenantshallrepairforhisownuse.Theseassetsmustbereturnedtothelandowneratleasecancellation.[13]

Forsharecontracts,severalthingsshouldbenoted.First,theexplicitstipulationsoftenantinputsandcropplantationsareimpliedbythetheoryofsharetenancy（seechapter2）.[14]Evidenceindicates,however,thatonlytheactualyieldsareinspected,forbyparisonwithadjacentfarmsorpastexperiencethelandownerwillbeabletodecidewhetherthecontractedtermshavebeenfulfilled:

Theabsenteelandlordssendtheiragents,orgothemselves,tothefieldsandestimatetheyieldofthecropandthesharegivenbythetenantisbasedonthisestimate.Suchmenareveryexpertinapproximatingthetrueyield……[Thetenant]monlycheatsbyskilfullyhidingsomeofthethreshedgrainbeforedivisiontakesplaceandalsobygivingthelandlordinferiorcrops.Ontheotherhand,thelandlordorhisagentoftenusesalargemeasure.Whentheagentcollectsrentthetenanthastotreattheagentverywellandoftenhastobribehiminordertokeepthelandforcultivationanotheryear.[15]

Exaggeratedasthisquotationmightbe,anintramarginaltenantwithspecificfarmingknowledge（hence,withhigheryieldsthanmarginaltenants）can"hide"asmuchastherentimputedtohisspecialskillandstillretainhistenancy;anagentcancollectenforcementcostin"bribes"fromboththelandownerandthetenantasmuchasotherpetingagentsallow.Nonetheless,thisjustifiesmyclaimthattransactioncostishigherforasharecontractthanforfixedrent.

Asecondcharacteristicofsharecontractsisthatthepreciseandattimesplexdelineationofresourcerightsbetweenthecontractingpartiessuggeststhatthesharingofinvestmentinputscanbeadjustedalongwiththerentalpercentagetouseresourcesefficiently.Thisisconsistentwithaconclusionreachedearlier,inchapter2：Thelandownermayeitherrequirethetenanttoinvestmoreinlandandchargealowerrentalpercentage,orthelandownermayinvestinlandhimselfandchargeahigherrentalpercentage.Theinvestmentwillbemadeinonewayortheotherifitleadstoahigherrentalannuity.