第35章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (29)

[12].Forthetenant'sincentivetouseanamountofinputlessthanthatstipulatedinasharecontract,seechapter3,sectionC.Theadoptionofdifferentformsofcontractualpaymentforlaboraloneowingto"shirking"problemsandenforcementcostsappearstoconstituteanimportantsubjectwhichhasnotbeenexplored.Forexample,apiece-ratecontractwillbepreferredtoawagecontractonanhourlybasisifcheckingoutputcostslessthanenforcinginput.However,withpieceratestheworkerisinclinedtobe"sloppy"andproduceproductsoflowerquality.Thus,apiece-ratecontractwillbelesspreferableifthephysicalattributesoftheproductaresuchthatitisrelativelycostlytopoliceaspecifiedstandard.Similarly,missionpayments（aswithinsurancesalesmen）arepreferredtootherformswhenthevalueofoutputdependsontheintensityofworkpersale;"tipping"payments（asinthecaseofwaitresses）arepreferredtootherformswhenthequalityofservicesissignificant-ineithercase,thecostsofenforcing"intensity"and"quality"ofworkappeartoberelativelyhigh.

[13].Inhorticulture,forexample,theusualcontractsotherthanownercultivationarewageorpiece-ratecontracts.Thismayimplythatinhorticulture,ownermanagementinvolvesalowercostofpolicingtheorchardassetsthanfixed-rentcontracts.Ontheotherhand,oneexpectsthatwagecontractswouldbeinfrequentwhenthelandholdingislarge,forhighcostsoflaborsupervisionwouldbeincurred.

[14].ThisresultisimpliedinWilliamF.Sharpe,"CapitalAssetPrices:ATheoryofMarketEquilibriumunderConditionsofRisk,"JournalofFinance（September,1964）；JackHirshleifer,"InvestmentDecision:Choice-TheoreticApproaches"；andidem,"InvestmentDecisionunderUncertainty:ApplicationsoftheState-PreferenceApproach,"QuarterlyJournalofEconomics（May,1966）."Risk-exchange"modelsderivedfromthecurrentstate-preferenceandmean-varianceapproaches,withtheaidofanEdgeworth-Bowleybox,suggestthatrisksharingispreferred-ifweignoretransactioncosts.

[15].Foratheoreticaltreatmentofassetpricesandriskpremiumsasdeterminedinthemarketplace,seeSharpe,"CapitalAssetPrices."

[16].ArthurYoung,TravelsinFranceduringtheYears1787,1788,and1789,ed.C.Maxwell.（CambridgeUniversityPress,1929）,p.395,editor'snote.

[17].Tointerprettheexistenceofthefermiersongroundsofriskaversionaloneseemsinconclusive.RonaldCoasehaspointedouttomethatthefermiersresembledthe"farmers"inEngland,whoservedtocollecttaxesandpostalrevenuesfortheCrown.Coase'sexplanationfortheexistenceoftheEnglish"farmers"isasfollows:acollectingagentwhoisallowedtotakethedifferencebetweenwhathecancollectandwhathehastopaytheCrownhasagreaterincentivetomaximizereceiptsthanifheispaidawagerateforhisservice.Thisargument,Ibelieve,iscorrect,andcanbeexpressedalternatively:transactioncostsdiffer,amongotherthings,becausedifferentsetsofstipulationsrequirevaryingeffortsinenforcementandnegotiation;andforcollectiona"farming"contractinvolvesalowercostofenforcementthanawagecontract.ThefermierofFrancemaythereforebeviewedasa"farming"agentaswellasan"insuring"agent.

[18].SeeTakekazuOgura,ed.,AgriculturalDevelopmentinModernJapan（Tokyo:JapanFAOAssociation,1963）,chap.13.IhavebeenunabletofindthefrequencyofsharecontractsinJapanbeforetheintroductionofthepulsorycropinsurance.

[19].See,forexample,J.L.Buck,LandUtilizationinChina,p.198；andJamesO.Bray,"FarmTenancyandProductivityinAgriculture:TheCaseoftheUnitedStates,"FoodResearchInstituteStudies,vol.4,no.1（1963）.

[20].SeeAppendixB;DepartmentofInternalAffairs,PublicReportsofInternalAffairs,vol.2（1932）；LegislativeYuan,StatisticalMonthly2,5（1930）；andShu-ChingLee,"TheHeartofChina'sProblem,theLandTenureSystems,"JournalofFarmEconomics（October,1946）.

B.CharacteristicsofFixedandShareContracts（China,1925-40）

InthisandthefollowingsectionIshallanalyzeinsomedetailtheobservedstipulationsoffixedandsharecontracts.Thiswillservenotonlytoclarifythehypothesisthatcontractualarrangementsarechosentodisperseriskbearingandminimizetransactioncost,butalsotofurtherconfirmthetheoryofsharetenancyderivedinthelasttwochapters.IturntosomeinformationfromChina,roughlyfrom1925to1940.Thischoiceofdataisbasednotonlyontheavailabilityofinformation,butalsoonthefactthatduringthisperiodinChina,some93percentofthefarmlandwasheldunderprivateownership.[1]Letmebeginbytranslatingafewsamplecontractsoffixedrent.

Samplea-fixed（crop）rentcontractwithdefiniteleaseduration（ShantungProvince）：

TenantAnowleasesfromlandownerB[somanyacres]oflandatlocationC.Weherebystipulate,withthepresenceofrefereeD,thattheannualrentperacreincludes[somanycatties]ofwheat,and[somanycatties]ofmillet,soybeans,andIndiancorn.Thepaymentinwheatwillbeonemonthafterthewheatharvest,andautumncropstwomonthsaftertheautumnharvest.Inafamineyear,rentalpaymentsshallbeadjusted[downward]accordingtolocalcustoms.Thedurationoftheleaseis[somanyyears].[2]

Sampleb-fixed（crop）rentcontractwithindefiniteleasedura-tion（KiangsiProvince）：

Wecontractuallyestablishaniron-sheet[firmlyfixed]rent……Regardlessofgoodorbadyears,notafractionofrentcanbereduced……Intheeventthattherentalpaymentisreducedordelayed,thelandownerisfreetotakebacktheland,togetherwithallexistingcrops,andtocontractanewtenantforcultivation……Furthermore,thelandownershallpaythetenant20coppercoinsforthedeliveryofevery100cattiesofgrains.[3]

Samplec-fixed（crop）rentcontractwithlandownerprovidingnonlandfarminginputs（TsinghaiProvince）：