第28章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (22)

Theresourceallocationimpliedbytheaboveequilibrium,whilesatisfyingtheParetocondition,takesaninterestingformwhichhasyettobeobserved:Therearemanytenantsworkingononefarmwitheachtenantmittingatrivialamountoflabor;eachtenantworksonmanyfarms,withhisaggregateinefromthesefarmscoveringhisalternativeearning.Insubstance,thisisidenticalwiththeformunderwhicheachtenantmitsallhislaborinputstoonefarmuntilthemarginalproductoftenantlaborequalsthemarginaltenantcost.However,weneverobservetenants'dispersingtheirinputsamongmanyfarmsasdescribedbecausetransactioncosts,andinparticularthecostofcontractingandthecostofmovingfromfarmtofarm,arenotzero.

[1].Inalessprehensiveform,thisisanalternativeexpressionoftheresultsobtainedinchapter2.

[2].Supposethemarginaltenantreceiptcurvesrisebeforefalling,andsupposetheproductionfunctionsinallfarmsareidentical.Givenr,thetenant（whoisnowentirelyfreetochoose）willdispersehistotalinputsuntiltheaveragetenantreceipt,（q/t）（1-r）,foreachfarmisatamaximum,orthemarginalproductoflandequalszero.Thisisanalternativeviewofaconditionimpliedbythelawofvariableproportionsunderlinearhomogeneity.

Indeed,underprivateownershipofresources,itisdifficulttodefineasetofconstraintswhichmakespositionAinfigure5anequilibrium.Understateownershipofland,however,aninterestingsetofconditionsforpositionAcanbespecified:（a）thatlandownershipbelongstothestateandthegovernmentarbi-trarilyassignslandtotenantswithrentscollectedonasharebasis;（b）thatthetenantisfreetoworkelsewhereatamarketwagerateandtheamountoflaborheusesonthestatelandisnotstipulated;and（c）thatthetenant'sleaserightoverthestatelandisnottransferableinanyform.Ifstrictlyenforced,itappearsthatequilibriumwillbeatA,andtheresidualearningsforthegovernmenttenantsaresimilarto"welfare"payments.Yetthisishardlythesetofconstraintswhichwritersonsharecroppinghaveinmind.

[3].Iftheindustrysupplyoftenantlaborisrising,theentryoftenantswillbeassociatedwithagradualriseinthewagerate.Thisplicationisignoredhere,andthewagerateusedinfigure5istheonefinallydeterminedinthemarket.

D.TestsofImplications

JustasD.GaleJohnsoncalledforempiricalconfirmationofresourceuseundersharetenancyin1950,Chinesewritersmadeasimilarinquiryintotenantfarmingingeneralsometwentyyearsearlier.Dataontenantfarmingwasthenassiduouslypiled.Inthelate1920sandearly1930sinChina,attacksonfarmingundertenancyweremon,andthedesirabilityofprivatelandownershipwasasubjectoffrequentdebate.Lackingstandardizedeconomictheorytosupporttheirarguments,severalChineseorganizationsandindependentwritersresortedtoempiricalinvestigations.ThedebateonthetenancyissuewassoonterminatedbytheSino-JapaneseWar.And,withtheexceptionoftwonotedworksintheEnglishlanguage,bothbyJohnLossingBuck,thegreaterpartofthesefindingshassinceremainedunknown.[1]

Theaforementionedfindings,inadequateastheymayseem,constitutethemostprehensivebodyofevidencerelatingtoagriculturallanduseunderunrestrainedprivatepropertyrightsthatIcouldfind.TheChineseexperience,togetherwithfindingsfromelsewhereinAsia,willbeappliedinthissectionandthenextchapter.Note,however,thatineveryinstanceweuseonlydatacollectedfromperiodsandlocationswheretheexistingsystemofpropertyrightsconformstotheconstraintonthebasisofwhichthetheoryofsharetenancyisderived.Therefore,thepostwarfarmlandreformsruleouttheuseofAsianagriculturaldataofthepasttwentyyearsinthispartofthestudy.

Applyingtheimplicationsofalternativetheoriesofsharetenancytoobservations,wecanperformseveralsimpletests.

Accordingtothestandardtheoryofsharetenancyderivedinchapter2,giventheproductionfunction,therentalpercentagedependsuponthefertilityoflandandthealternativeearningofthetenant.Specifically,weshouldobserveahigherrentalper-centageif（a）thelandismorefertileor（b）thecostoftenantinputsislower.[2]Evidenceconfirmingthishypothesisisstrong:

1.Accordingtoaninvestigationwhichcovers641samplefarmsinelevenlocalitiesinChina（1921-25）,J.L.Buckobserved:

Asrentthetenantgivesthelandlordone-halfofthegrainandstrawfromwheatandriceland,two-fifthsofthegrainandstrawfromricelandonly,andthree-tenthsofthegrainandstrawfrompoorland.[3]

Likewise,itwasobservedinKweichowProvince（1929-30）that:

Therentalsharesdependonthefertilityofland.Ontheaverageandroughlyspeaking,foruppergradelandtherentalshareis60percent;formediumgrade50percent;andforlowergrade40percent.[4]

Casualobservationsaside,numericaldatashowingthesamepatternswerecollectedbytheLegislativeYuan（China,1930）andtheDepartmentofInternalAffairs（China,1932）.[5]ThefindingsofthelatterhavebeenputedandplacedinAppendixB,becausetheyenpasstwenty-twoprovincesinChinawithsevengradesofland.

2.InTaiwan,amaximumrentalof37.5percentoftheannualyieldwasenforcedbythegovernmentin1949.Thismaximumpercentagewasuniformforalltenantcontracts,regardlessofwhetherthelandinvolvedwaspaddyfieldordryfield.Thedatarevealthat99.4percentofthepaddyfieldsundertenancywereaffectedbythissharerestriction;thatis,theinitialrentalsharewashigherthan37.5percentoftheyield.However,only50.9percentofthedryfieldsundertenancywereaffectedbythesamerestriction.[6]Thisimpliesthathigherrentalpercentagesweregenerallyassociatedwiththemorefertilepaddyfieldsunderafreemarket.