第26章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (20)

Theprocessbywhichthelandlordandtenantenterintoaleaseisnotwellunderstood.Thepricesystemdoesnotfunctioninthenormalsense,forlandisnotnecessarilyrentedtothetenantofferingthehighestrentpayment.However,thereisonlyadifferenceofmodestdegreeintheroleofpricerationingintheshare-rentalmarketandinthecash-rentalmarket.[30]

Inthecourseofhisanalysis,Johnsonhadobtained-andabandoned-aconditionwhichisquitesufficienttorevealthemarkettermsofasharecontract.Referringtothetheoreticalformulation,hewrote:

Isitlikelythatatenantoperatingundertheseconditionswillallocatehisresourcesinexactlythesamewaythathewouldifpayingacashrentindependentoftheactualoutput?Theanswerisapparentlyinthenegative.Thereisonlyoneaveragerentperacreforwhichtheresourceallocationswillbethesameunderavariable-shareproportionandafixedrentperacre.Andthereisnoreasontobelievethatthisparticularrentwouldemergeunderpetitiveconditions.[31]

Whynot?Asshowninthelastchapter,theidentityoftheaveragerentunderfixedandsharecontractsexists,inequilibirum,whenrentperacreisatamaximum.Thismaximumrentperacreisuniquebecauseitisobtainedwhenthemarginalnonlandcostequalsthemarginalproductofnonlandinputs.Theassociatedlandsizepertenant,valuesofnonlandinputsandrentalpercentage,willbethetermsstipulatedinthesharecontract.Thus,itissomewhatpuzzlingthatJohnsonalsowrote:

Withashort-termleaserentersareobviouslyawarethatlandlordshavethealternativeofrentingtheirlandforacashrentindependentofcurrentoutput.Consequently,thetenantmustplantoproduceanaverageoutputperacrethatwillprovidearentalpayment,ifyieldsareaverage,equaltothepossiblecashrent……[32]

Theapparentcontradictionbetweenthisandtheearlierquotationcanperhapsbereconciledasfollows:Inrejectingthetheoreticalidentityoftheaveragerentunderfixedandsharecontracts,Johnsonwasfollowingamodelinwhichthisidentitycannotbeobtained.Inacceptingtheidentity,empiricallyhisobservationledhimtosearchforanotherinterpretation.AswesawwhenwediscussedMarshall,thetheoreticalidentitycanbederivedonlyiftherentalpercentageistreatedasavariable.MyownimpressionofJohnson'sinsightfulworkisthathemaintainsthatalthoughsharerentislessproductivethanfixedrentaccordingtoamodelwithconsiderablelimitationstheymaynonethelessbeidenticalinpractice.Forthisreasonperhaps,hecalledfor"anempiricalverification……of[theeffectsof]shareleasesuponresourceallocation."[33]

[1].Atpageproof,GeorgeJ.StiglerinformedmethatMilldidrecognizerentasacostofproduction,whereasMarshallwasreluctant.

[2].SeeMarshall,PrinciplesofEconomics（8thed.,1920；London;Macmillan＆Co.,1956）,pp.534-37.

[3].Ibid.,bk.4,chap.3；andbk.6,chap.10,p.536.

[4].Ibid.,pp.535-36.

[5].Marshallwasaware,likeotherwritersbeforehim,thatfixedrentsandownercultivatorsexistedtogetherwithmetayersinEurope.Variousestimatesonthefrequencyofmetayerfarmsdiffergreatly.

[6].Marshall,PrinciplesofEconomics,p.536.

[7].Ibid.

[8].Higgs,"'Metayage'inWesternFrance,"TheEconomicJournal（March,1894）,pp.1-13.

[9].Ibid.,p.9andn.1.

[10].Seeibid.,pp.9-13.

[11].Marshall,PrinciplesofEconomics,p.536,n.2.

[12].ThoughMarshallwasawarethattherentalpercentagewasnotthesameeverywhere（p.535,n.1）,henotedthatforcustomaryreasonsvariationofit"couldseldombedonewithoutanappearanceofviolence"（p.533）.Noevidenceof"violence"wasoffered.

ThetheoreticaldifficultyMarshallencounteredasaresultofnotvaryingtherentalpercentagewasmadeevidentwhenhewrote（p.536,n.2）：

If[thelandlord]cannotmodifytheamount[ofcapital],butstillcontroltheamountofthetenant'slabour,thenwithcertainshapesoftheproducecurve,thecultivationwillbemoreintensivethanitwouldbeontheEnglishplan[fixedrent]；butthelandlord'ssharewillbesomewhatless.Thisparadoxicalresulthassomescientificinterest,butlittlepracticalimportance.

[13].Seechapter2,andsectionCofthischapter.Note,however,thatifseveralcropsaregrown,multiplerentalpercentagesmayexistinonesharecontractduetodifferentfactorintensitiesrequiredfordifferentcrops.Seechapter4,sectionB.

[14].Marshall,PrinciplesofEconomics,bk.6,chap.10.

[15].Transferabilityofrightsamongindividualownersimpliesexclusivityinuse,atleasttosomedegree.Transfersofresourcerightsinthemarketplacearenotconfinedtooutrighttransfers,butalsoincludevariousleasingarrangements.Alegalrestrictionononeformoranotherofthesetransfersmayimposeahighercostoftransaction,butstillmaynotconstituteasetofconstraintsdifferentenoughtoaffectresourceusesignificantly.ThatfreelyalienablerightsexistedfortheFrenchmetayageisevidentinYoung,Travels,Maxwelledition,"Editor'sNotes."

WhenN.Georgescu-Roegenanalyzedsharetenancy,hereferredtoitasaformoflandtenureunder"feudalism."Butwehaveyettoidentifythepropertyrightconstraintdefining"feudalism."Georgescu-Roegenalsoemployedthetax-equivalentapproachandreachedtheconclusionthatsharecroppingwasinefficient.Seehis"EconomicTheoryandAgrarianEconomics,"OxfordEconomicPapers（February,1960）,pp.23-26.

[16].RainerSchickele,"EffectsofTenureSystemsonAgriculturalEfficiency,"JournalofFarmEconomics（February,1941）,pp.185-207.

[17].EarlO.Heady,"EconomicsofFarmLeasingSystems,"JournalofFarmEconomics（August,1947）,pp.659-78.

[18].Schickele,"EffectsofTenureSystems,"p.193.

[19].Ibid.,p.195.

[20].Heady,"FarmLeasingSystems,"p.672.

[21].Ibid.,p.673.

[22].CharlesIssawi,"FarmOutputunderFixedRentsandShareTenancy,"LandEconomics（February,1957）,p.76.

[23].D.GaleJohnson,"ResourceAllocationunderShareContracts,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy（April,1950）,pp.111-23.