第23章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (17)

[12].Young,Travels,Dublinedition,pp.241-42.Youngofferedlittleanalysistosupporthisclaims,andonedoubtshisimpartialitywhenhestated:"Themetayersweresomiserablypoor,itwasimpossibleforthemtocultivatewell.Istartedsomeobservationsonthemodeswhichoughttobepursued;butallconversationofthatsortistimelostinFrance"（Maxwelledition,pp.202-3）.

[13].Young,Travels,Betham-Edwardsedition.

[14].Ibid.,p.18.

[15].Young,Travels,Maxwelledition,pp.361-404.

[16].WhenBetham-EdwardswroteinherintroductiontoYoung'sTravels（p.vi）,that"nothinghasdonemore[thanmetayage]toimprovetheconditionofthepeasantandofhusbandrywithinthelastfiftyyears,"shewasnotspeakingofFrenchagricultureatYoung'stime.Thus,Maxwell'seditingmethodappearsmoreappropriate.Maxwell'sopiniononmetayageisworthnoting:

Itwasnotperhapssomuchacauseofpovertyhoweverasaresult,andthatitwasasystemthatworkedratherbetterinpracticethanintheoryisshownbythefactthatitsurvivedtheRevolution,andisstillarecognizedformofland-holding……EvenbeforetheRevolutionthereweremanyFrenchlandlordswholivedonexcellenttermswiththeirmetayers,visitingthemintheirholdingsanddiscussingagriculturalmatterswiththem（Maxwelledition,p.xxx）.

[17].SeeYoung,Travels,Dublinedition,p.239.

[18].Young'saccountoftaxesisbestseeninachapterontheRevolution（Travels,Maxwelledition,pp.327-60）.Onp.xxvi,Maxwellnoted:"Accordingtorecentestimates36percentofthepeasant'sinedisappearedindirecttaxestotheState;14percentwentontithespayabletotheChurch;while11or12percentwasconsumedbyseigneurialduesatYoung'stime."

[19].Seeibid.,pp.296-97.

[20].RichardJones,AnEssayontheDistributionofWealthandontheSourcesofTaxation,part1—Rent（London:JohnMurrary,1831）.Tomyknowledge,noPart2waseverissued.ThatJonessharedSmith'sviewoflandleasedevelopmentisevidentthroughouttheentirevolume,andesp.onpp.73-75.

[21].Ibid.,p.91.

[22].Ibid.,pp.98-99.

[23].Ibid.,p.102.

[24].J.C.L.SimondedeSismondi,PoliticalEconomy[1815]（NewYork:AugustusM.Kelley,1966）,pp.41-42.

[25].SeeJohnStuartMill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy（4thed.；London:JohnW.ParkerandSon,1857）,Book2,chap.8,"OfMetayers."

[26].Ibid.,p.367.J.R.McCullochwasanothernoted"Englishauthority"whowrote:

Thepracticeoflettinglandsbyproportionalrents……isverygeneralonthecontinent;andwhereverithasbeenadopted,ithasputastoptoallimprovements,andhasreducedthecultivatorstothemostabjectpoverty[PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy（Edinburgh,1843）,p.471].

[27].Mill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,p.380.

[28].Ibid.,pp.366-67.

[29].Ibid.,p.367.

[30].Ibid.,pp.365-66.

[31].NotethatthelaststatementinthisquotationisquitedifferentfromJones'sview.

[32].SeeMill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,p.363andthesecondfootnoteonp.364.

[33].Ibid.,p.363.

[34].Ibid.,p.364.

[35].MillquotesSismondiinibid.,pp.363-64.

[36].Thisisdrawnfrommyimpressionoftheirdiscussionofdistribution.See,forexample,Jones,DistributionofWealth;Sismondi,PoliticalEconomy,chap.3；McCulloch,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,pt.3；andMill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,bk.2.

[37].Mill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,pp.380-81.

B.TheNeoclassicalView

Severalanalyticaldeficienciesstoodinthewayofclassicalwritersinarrivingatageneralsolutionforresourceuseundersharetenancy.Otherthantheirconceptualambiguitiesmentionedearlier,classicalwritersfailedtotreatlandrentaspartofproductioncost.[1]Furthermore,themarginalanalysisrequiredtoreachanequilibriumwasvague.TheseshortingsdidnothandicapAlfredMarshallwhenheanalyzedsharecropping.Butwhereas,beforeMarshall,SismondiandMillhadnotplacedmuchweightonthetax-equivalentargument,Marshallrenewedthethesis,presumablybecausetheanalogytoataxundersharerentfitsratherneatlyintohismarginalanalysis.[2]Evenwithsuchanapproach,Marshallalmostobtainedthecorrectsolutioninafootnote.

BytracingfootnotesintwochaptersofMarshall'sPrinciples,40onederivesadiagramusedbyseveralsubsequenteconomists.Withfullerexposition,thisispresentedinfigure4.Forsimplicity,letusassumethattheonlytenantinputislabor.Infigure4,tenantlabor,t,ismeasuredalongthehorizontalaxis,and

representsthemarginalproductoftenantlaborwithagivenplotofland.Themarginaltenantcost,

,ishorizontalinapetitivemarket,withWastheprevailingwagerate.Ifthelandowneristohirefarmhandstodothetilling,equilibriumisatB,andthequantityoffarmlaborhiredwillbet2.Atthisequilibrium,wehavethemarginalequality:

=.

Thesameresultobtainsforownercultivation,whethertheownerworksuptot2andworkselsewhere,orwhetherheworkstolessthant2andhiresadditionallaborersatW.ThetotalrentasareturntolandreceivedbythelandownerisrepresentedbytheareaMDB,anamountequaltothatofafixed-rentcontract.

Underthetaxapproachofanalyzingsharetenancy,however,themarginaltenantreceiptnetofrent,

（1-r）,willshiftdownwardateverypoint.Thatis,ifthelandownertakes[3]percentoftheannualyield（r=0.4）andthetenanttakes60percent,

（1-r）willbe60percentof

ateverypoint.Withthetenant'sdecisionmadeatthemargin,itissaid,equilibriumisatA,wherethemarginaltenantcostequalsthemarginaltenantreceipt;thatis,

=

（1-r）.Theassociatedquantityoftenantlaborwillbet1.Underthiscondition,thetotalproductisrepresentedbytheareaODJt1,withthelandownergettingarentequaltoareaEDJAandthetenant'sshareequalingOEAt1.Asshown,areaMEArepresentstheamountreceivedbytheten-antoverandabovehisalternativeearning（areaOMAt1）.WithequilibriumatA,themarginalproductoftenantlaborishigherthanthemarginaltenantcost.Sharetenancyisthereforeinefficient（withareaJABrepresentingtheeconomicwaste）.

ItwaswiththisanalysisinmindthatMarshallmented: