第18章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (12)

Toillustrate,returnmomentarilytofigure3.Inafixed-rentcontract,thelandownerwillbeabletochargearentequaltothemaximumof（q-f）/hperacre,orar,andthearearentedbythetenantwillagainbeT1,wheretherentperacreequalsthemarginalproductofland.Givenq/handf/hasshown,ifanarealargerthanT1isrented,therentalpriceperacrewillbehigherthanthemarginalproductofland.Conversely,ifanareasmallerthanT1isrented,thetenant'stotalinefromfarmingwillbelessthanhisalternativeearning.Thus,underfixedrent,thelandsizeperfarmandtherentalannuityreceivedbythelandownerwillbeexactlythesameasundersharetenancy.[1]Furthermore,ifthesamecropsaretobeplantedonthesamegradeofland,havingthesameproductionfunction,thetenantunderfixedrentwillhavetomitthesamef/htosurvivepetition.Asinsharecropping,ifonetenantdoesnotpossessthenecessaryamountofinputs,hemayacquirethemthroughvariousmeansorrentafarmwhichrequireslessfarminginputs.

Letusalsopressthequestion:Undersharetenancy,whatcriteriawillthecontractingpartiesuseinarrivingattheequi-libriumlandsizeandrentalpercentageforeachtenant?Clearly,themostefficienttypeofcropstobeplantedonthegivenlandmustbechosen,andthetenantinputsrequiredmustbeconsidered-allexantedecisionswithsomedegreeofuncertainty.Surely,erroneousdecisionsmayoccurowingtowrongexpectationsbyeitherpartytothecontract.Thiswillresultinthetenantlandsizeortherentalpercentagedifferingfromwealthmaximization.Itisequallyclear,however,thatsomesimplerulesexistinthemarketwhichthecontractingpartieswillfollow.Givenlandofaparticulargrade,thereexist,atprevailingmarketpricesoflandandotherfactorsofproduction,certainbinationsoftenantinputrequirements,rentalpercentages,andtenantlandsizes.

Indeed,givenfreelyalienable（marketable）landrightsunderprivateownership,alandownerdoesnothavetoknowthedetailsoffarminghimself.orgpetitionforresourceownershipswillinduceefficientcontracts.Ifalessvaluablecropisplantedbythetenant,iftherentalpercentageistoolow,thelandsizepertenanttoolarge,orthetenantinputsrequiredtoolittle,therentalannuityasareturntolandforthelandownerwillbeataratelowerthantherateofinterest.Inthissituation,thelandownerwilleithermaketheproperadjustments,leasethelandtoadifferenttenant,chooseadifferentcontractualarrangement,orsellhislandownershipoutright.Ontheotherhand,ifthecontractualagreementsaresuchthatthetenantisreceivingasharelowerthanhisalternativeearning,otherlandownerswillbidhisservicesaway,orthetenantmayturntowagelabor.

Aswithpetitionamonglandowners,petitionamongtenantswillinsurethatthecontractedamountoftenantinputsismitted.Indeed,bycheckingtheoutputalonethelandownerwillknowwhetherthecontractedtermsarerespectedbythetenantandwilldecidewhetherthesharecontractshouldbecontinued.Inpractice,however,thetransactionsarefrequentlyhandledbyhiredagentswhospecializeinapproximatingthetrueyield.Andinspiteofnumerousclaimsbyreformersandnoveliststhattenantscouldmakenodecisionandthereforewereexploited,itisrefreshingtopointoutthat,inChinaatleast,sharecontractingwasratherpolite:

Assoonasthegrainisthreshedthetenantinvitesthelandlordtoafeast,afterwhichthegrainisdividedandthetenantdeliversthelandlord'ssharetohishome.Afteritisproperlydeliveredthelandlordgivesthetenantafeast.Ifthelandlordwishestodismissthetenanthedoessoatthistime.Ifthetenantwishestoleave,hetakesthesailsfromthewindmilljustbeforethelandlordestothetenant'sfeastasasigntothelandlordofhisintentions.[2]

Ouranalysisthusfarhasprimarilybeenconfinedtoaconditionofzerocostofcontracting.Thisassumptionisdroppedinchapter4,inwhichwediscussproblemsoftransactioncostandthecharacteristicsofleasestipulations.Butletusfirsttracethedevelopmentofthetheoryofsharetenancy,andperformtestsofimplicationsforalternativetheories.

[1].Forstillanotherexpositiononthis,seechapter3,sectionC.

[2].JohnLossingBuck.ChineseFarmEconomy（Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1930）,pp.148-49.

3.TraditionalViewsofSharecroppingandTestsofAlternativeHypotheses

Perhapsthetheoreticalresultsreachedintheprecedingchapterwouldhavebeenobtainedbyearlierwritershaditnotbeenforsomeillusoryviewsfosteredbytradition.Inparticular,thereistheanalogyfrequentlydrawnbetweensharerentandanexcisetax.Sinceundersharecroppingaportionofeveryoutputunitproducedistakenasrent,ityieldstheimpressionofbeingsimilartoanadvaloremexcisetax-wherepartofeveryunitproducedis"taxed"bythelandowner（government）.Thedistributionofoutputisnotthesame,itisbelieved,aswithfixedrentorownercultivation-wherethetillerobtainstheentireincrementalproduct.Sharetenancy,therefore,issaidtoresultinlessintensive（andlessefficient）farmingbecausethetenant'sincentivetoworkorinvestinlandisreduced.[1]

Itisnotdifficulttoshowthattheapplicationoftheanalysisofataxtosharetenancy（hereaftercalledthe"tax-equivalent"approach）iserroneous.Thehypothesesstemmingtherefromfailonseveralcounts.Inthetax-equivalentapproach,thewritersgenerallyfailtorealizethatthepercentagesharesandarearentedundersharetenancyarenotmysteriously"fixed"butarepetitivelydeterminedinthemarket.Furthermore,thesewritersfailtospecifythenatureofthesystemoflandownershipuponwhichtheirhypothesesareconstructed.Letmeclarify.