第14章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (8)

[1].ThelandlaweffectiveinTaiwaninthepostwarperiodbutbeforethelandreformwasthesameasthatpromulgatedbytheChineseNationalGovernmentinJune30,1930,enforcedMarch1,1936,andamendedApril29,1946.However,theChineselandlawgoverningprivatefarmlandshadbeenbasicallythesamelongbefore1930.Themainrevisionsin1930and1946involvedtheadditionofdiscriminatoryprovisionsagainstaliensandprecautionaryarticlesforfuturenationalinterest.Thus,therewasnosubstantialtransformationinthesystemofpropertyundertheNationalGovernment.AllarticlescitedhereafterareinChen,LandReforminTaiwan,pp.133-90.TheChineseversionofthesearticlesisinChinaLandBureau,RulesandRegulationsofLandAdministration（China:NationalGovernment,1947）.

[2].JCRR,"AnnualReports,"p.8.

[3].Wemayregardarightasalimitedauthoritytomakedecisionsaboutresources;thatdecisionauthorityusuallyhasapositivepresentvalue.

[4].Toavoidambiguities,wemaysimplyregard"labor"and"capital"asphysicalinputentities.

[5].Certainotherusesorrightsinlandwerebeingdenied.Forexample,"mineralsattachedtoanylandshallnotbeeprivateproperty,evenifprivateownershipofthesaidlandhasbeendulyacquired"（Art.15）.SeealsoArt.12and13.

[6].Transferstoalienswererestricted（Arts.17-24）.

[7].SeeArts.33and107.

[8].Chen,RecordsofTaiwanLandReform,pp.17-18.

[9].SeeRonaldH.Coase,"TheProblemofSocialCost,"TheJournalofLawandEconomics（October,1960）；andArmenA.Alchian,"SomeEconomicsofPropertyRights,"mimeographed（SantaMonica:TheRandCorporation,1963）.

2.TheTheoryofShareTenancy

Inthischapteratheoryofresourceallocationundersharecontractsisderived.Theanalysisisbasedonthepremiseofwealthmaximizationsubjecttotheconstraintsofprivatepropertyrightsinafreemarket,thatis,onewithoutrentalrestriction.Underexclusiveandtransferableresourcerights,eachcontractingpartyisfreetoacceptorrejectthenegotiatedtermsofasharecontract.Unlessotherwiseindicated,azerocostofcontractingisassumed.[1]

A.TheSolutionDefined

Infigure1,theabscissaoftheverticalsupplycurve,-5,indicatesthetotalareaoflandbelongingtoalandlord.Lethdenotethelandareaheldbyatenant,andqbetheproduct.Themarginalproductofland,

,diminishesashincreases,holdingthefarminginputsofonetenant（oronetenantfamily）constant.Supposetherentchargedbythelandowneris60percentoftheannualyield,thatis,r=0.6.Amarginalcontractrentcurve,

r,isat60percentof.

Theverticaldistancebetween

and

risthemarginaltenantine,

（1-r）,definedasthechangeintenantinewithrespecttoachangeinlandareausedbythetenant.Theshadedareabetween

and

rrepresentsthetotalfarminginereceivedbythetenant,andtheareabelow

rrepresentsthetotalrentcollectedbythelandowner.Ifthetenant'sineisashighasorhigherthanhisalternativeearning,hewillstayinfarmingandwilluseallthelandavailabletohimonthisfarmaslongasthemarginalproductivityoflandisgreaterthanzero,withallfarminginputsotherthanlandheldconstant.Tomaximizewealth,thelandownerwillraisetherentalpercentage-thusthe

rcurve-untilthetenant'sinefromfarmingequalshisalternativeearning.

However,therentalpercentageisnottheonlyvariablewhichthelandownercanadjusttomaximizehiswealth.Thelandlordwillnotallowonetenanttocultivateallthelandheownsifparcelinghislandtoseveraltenantswillresultinahighertotalrent.Thisisillustratedinfigure2.Inthisfigure,verticallinesT1,T2,T3……aredividinglinesofplotsoflandtothefirst,second,andthirdtenantrespectively.Asthenumberoftenantscultivatingtheavailablelandincreases,themarginalproductoflandshiftsupwardrelativetothesituationwherethereisonlyonetenant.

Assumeforthemomentthattherentalpercentageisthesameforalltenants.Thecurves

,

……arethemarginalproductivitiesoflandforeachtenant,and

r,

r,……aretherespectivemarginalcontractrentcurvesforeachtenant.[2]Theineforeachtenantisrepresentedbytheareabetweentherespective

and

rcurvesforthetenant.

Tomaximizehiswealth,thelandownerwillmaximizethediffer-encebetweentheintegralofthemarginalproductivitiesoflandandtheintegralofthetenants'ines,whichisrepresentedbytheshadedareainfigure2.Thatis,thelandownerwillmaketheintegralofmarginalcontractrentsamaximum.Thisimpliesthattheineofeachtenantwillnotbehigherthanhisalternativeearning.

Astheareaoflandassignedtoeachtenantbeessmaller,however,therentalpercentagethelandlordchargesmustbelowerforthetenanttoobtainhisalternativeearning,whichcallsforadecreaseinmarginalcontractrent,

r,inordertopreventthetenantfromgivingupthelease.Thisdecreasein

rwillleadtoalowerrentreceivedfromeachtenant,andifthelandsizepertenantcontinuestodecrease,therentalpercentagewilleventuallybeesolowthatthetotalrentfromthelandwilldecline.Thesolutionisthuswelldefined:Maximizationofthelandowner'swealth,givenhistotallandholdingsandthecostoftenantinputs,requiresthesimultaneousdeterminationofthelandsizepertenantandtherentalpercentage.Inotherwords,withprivatepropertyrightsoverlandandtenantinputresources,thetermsinasharecontractmutuallyagreeduponbythelandownerandthetenantwillincludetherentalpercentageandtheratioofnonlandtolandinputthatareconsistentwithequilibrium.